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. . I •' - i - i n 
JPEISPICTJQN 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The proceedings in the Fourth District Court were in 
the form of an appeal from an administrative decision rendered in 
the Department of Health. The appeal to the Fourth District 
Court was pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §26-23-2(3) (1987 Supp.). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the Executive Directorfs decision denying Mr. 
Tibbetts1 Medicaid application based on Tibbetts1 excess assets 
either capricious or not supported by the evidence? 
2. Should the Executive Directori's decision be 
equitably estopped even though the evidence clearly shows that no 
formal application was made until January 1^86 and that such 
application was never actually approved but formally denied on 
March 26# 1986, on the basis of Mr. Tibbetts• excess assets? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, This is a case to determine 
whether David Tibbetts1 Medicaid application was properly denied 
based on the fact that he owned six and one-half acres of 
property which were determined to be excess assets under the 
pertinent Medicaid regulations. 
B. CPWrse Pf PrPCeefling?* On or about January 3, 
1986, Petitioner ("Tibbetts") applied for Medicaid assistance in 
behalf of his four children for retroactive benefits to cover the 
cost of their dental treatment in December 1985. (R. 20, 34). On 
or about January 10, 1986, Tibbetts paid the medical excess 
($87.35) for the month of December 1985 (R. 20). The medical 
excess is the amount Tibbettfs monthly income exceeded the basic 
maintenance standard for his family as set by the federal 
government. Tibbetts1 application, however, was held and neither 
denied nor approved by the original caseworker at the Office of 
Community Operations ("OCO"). (R. 20, 32). On or about March 
18, 1986, Tibbetts reapplied for Medical Assistance. (R. 20, 34-
35) . The caseworker who processed this March application 
discovered that Tibbetts owned a home on eight (8) acres of 
property in Genola, Utah. (R. 20, 34-35). On March 26, 1986, 
OCO sent Tibbetts a letter notifying him of his ineligibility for 
medical assistance in December 1985 as a result of his excess 
assets. Specifically, it was discovered by the second caseworker 
that a road on this eight acre property actually split the 
property into two parcels. On one side of the road were the one 
and one-half acres where Tibbetts1 home was located. On the 
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other side of the road were the remaining six and one-half acres 
which had had an appraised value of between $15,000.00 and 
$18,000.00. (R. 20, 36-37). Following notification of the 
denial, Mr. Tibbetts requested a hearing, which was held on April 
9, 1986, before the Fair Hearing Officer Neil Bernson. (R. 31). 
The hearing officer issued his recommended decision sustaining 
OCO's denial of eligibility on July 31, 1986. (R. 19). On 
August 7, 1986, Respondent Dr. Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director 
of the Utah Department of Health, adopted the hearing officer's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and affirmed OCO's 
previous denial based on Tibbetts' excess assets. (R. 18). 
Tibbetts then appealed the Executive Director's 
decision to Fourth District Court. Inasmuch as there were no 
material facts in dispute, both parties filed motions for summary 
judgment (R. 54, 73). On November 18, 1987, Judge George E. 
Ballif filed his Ruling and denied Tibbetts' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granted Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
affirming the Executive Director's Final Determination denying 
Tibbetts medical assistance. (R. 93). On November 25, 1987, 
Judge Ballif entered his Order from which Tibbetts appealed to 
this Court. (R. 97). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No material facts remain in dispute, therefore, the 
essential facts are set forth above in Statement of the Case. 
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STAMPfrEP PF RPVIRW 
The standard of review governing such cases is clearly 
established by Utah Code Ann. §26-23-2(3) (1987 Supp.): 
If the final determination of the executive 
director is consistent with the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law recommended by the hearing 
officer, the court shall review the record and may 
alter the final determination only upon a finding 
that the final determination is capricious, or not 
supported by the evidence. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, in the instant casef this Court may only alter Dr. Dandoyfs 
Final Determination if the record reveals caprice or that the 
decision is unsupported by the evidence adduced at the Fair 
Hearing before Hearing Officer Bernson. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent Dandoy denied Tibbetts1 Medicaid application 
based on the fact that he owned a separate six and one-half acre 
parcel of land which had an appraised value of at least 
$15#000.00. Dandoyfs denial is not capricious or unsupported by 
the evidence. APA Vol. Ill §411.1 exempts one home and lot on 
which the home stands. The lot size must not exceed the average 
size lot in the community. Tibbetts owns eight acres of land. 
This property, however, contains a road which is used by Genola 
City as a right-of-way and which separates Tibbetts1 property 
into two distinct segments. On one side of this road are the one 
and one-half acres containing Tibbetts1 home. This parcel is 
exempt under the "one home and lot" exemption under APA Vol. Ill 
§411.1. However, on the other side of the easement are the 
remaining six and one-half acres of property which contain no 
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home. Tibbetts has attempted over the past three years to sell 
this separate parcel of property for at least $15f000.00. This 
property was correctly deemed non-exempt under APA Vol. Ill 
S411.1 by Respondent Dandoy in her Final Determination. 
Certainly, the fact that Tibbetts owns and may legally sell a 
$15#000.00 parcel of property which contains no home, 
disqualifies him for medical assistance. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel should only be 
applied against the government in rare instances. The facts in a 
given case determine whether the doctrine should be invoked. The 
instant case does not warrant interposition of this defense. 
Petitioner Tibbetts1 first application was never actually 
approved by his first caseworker. There is absolutely nothing in 
the case file that supports Tibbetts' claim that he received 
verbal and written confirmation relative to his Medicaid 
eligibility, prior to the March letter notifying him that his 
application was denied due to excess assets. This March denial 
letter is the only documented correspondence between the OCO 
office in Provo and Tibbetts that appears in the case file. 
Government operations would be severely hampered, if Respondent 
Dandoy is estopped from denying Tibbetts' application based 
simply on an applicant's uncorroborated version of the facts. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR'S FINAL DETERMINATION 
IS NOT CAPRICIOUS AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly referred 
to as Medicaid, is a joint federal/state program that was enacted 
for the purpose of furnishing medical assistance to certain 
eligible individuals "whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C.A. 
§1396 (Law Ed. 1985). Medicaid is not intended to be general 
medical insurance coverage for all United States residents, but 
rather is limited to helping only certain classes of those "whose 
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of 
medical services»" as defined in the eligibility standards set 
forth in the State Medicaid Plan. Because of heavy demands on 
the Medicaid program, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services has indicated the necessity of 
targeting "scarce resources on [those] most in need and 
restricting eligibility to the truly needy." 47 Fed. Reg. 5648, 
5655 (Feb. 5, 1982). Thus, an applicant for medical assistance, 
such as Petitioner Tibbetts, must satisfy strict eligibility 
standards contained in the State Medical Plan to be eligible for 
such financial aid. The record evidence clearly shows that 
Tibbetts1 property assets disqualified him for Medicaid coverage 
for December 1985. 
It is well established that administrative agencies, 
such as the Utah Department of Health, are accorded considerable 
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deference by reviewing courts in the administration and 
functioning of their numerous governmental duties. Further, it 
has been consistently recognized that an administrative agency 
must exercise its vested authority according to its own 
understanding and conscience. See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 
U.S. 260 (1954)• The exercise of this discretion by 
administrative agencies will not be invalidated as "capricious", 
unless the decision lacks a rational basis or is premised upon a 
finding of fact based on an erroneous view of the law. Woodyard 
v. Arkansas Diversified Insurance Company, 594 S.W.2d 13, 15, 268 
Ark. 171 (1980). Simply because a reviewing court might act 
differently than the public official, if confronted by the same 
factors, does not justify altering that administrative exercise 
of discretion. Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Insurance 
Company, 594.S.W.2d at 15-16. 
The facts adduced at the Fair Hearing in the instant 
case clearly demonstrate that Respondent Dandoy did not act 
capriciously in denying Tibbetts1 application for medical 
assistance. As both parties agree, Petitioner Tibbetts, at the 
time that he filed for assistance, owned eight acres of land in 
Genola, Utah. There is a road which divides this eight acre 
piece of property into two (2) parcels of land, one parcel of one 
and one-half acres on which Petitioner Tibbetts1 home is located, 
and the other parcel of six and one-half acres. (R. 36-37). 
Petitioner Tibbetts admitted that this residential lot of eight 
acres used to be one lot "but the town [Genola] had a right of 
way" on the road of the property. (R. 36). In fact. Petitioner 
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admitted that he has attempted to sell this separate six and one-
half acre parcel for the last three years. (R. 37). The 0C0 
office also determined in March 1986 that this six and one-half 
acre parcel had an estimated value of between $15,000.00 and 
$18,000.00. (R. 37). Moreover, Petitioner Tibbetts admitted 
during the course of his Fair Hearing that his asking price for 
the six and one-half acres was $15,000.00. (R. 37). Tibbetts1 
application was denied for the reason that he certainly had 
available resources that were not exempt under the relevant 
regulations which govern questions of Medicaid eligibility. 
These Medicaid policies and criteria are contained in 
the Assistance Payment Administration Manual ("APA"). 
Specifically, APA Volume III §411.1, which applies to this 
particular question, states, in pertinent part: 
1.. One Home and Lot - All Cases Exclude one home 
. . . . and lot owned or being purchased and 
occupied by the client. 
a. The lot on which the home stands shall not 
exceed the average size of residential lots in the 
community where it is. Count the equity value of 
property exceeding the average size lot. (R. 47). 
Hence, under the above cited standards concerning 
eligibility of benefits, Tibbetts1 one and one-half acres, on 
which his home stands, do not exceed the average size of 
residential lots found in Genola, Utah. This parcel containing 
his home is therefore exempt for purposes of determining Medicaid 
eligibility pursuant to APA Vol. Ill §411.1. 
The remaining parcel of six and one-half acres, 
however, is separated by a road and thus is distinct from the 
residential parcel of one and one-half acres on which the 
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Tibbetts home is located. (R. 36). Under APA Vol. Ill §411.1 
this property which has an appraisal value of at least $15,000.00 
is not exempt and is an available, countable resource for 
eligibility determination. (R. 35). Tibbetts has attempted to 
sell this distinct parcel of six and one-half acres, which is 
divided by a road which the City of Genola uses as a right-of-
way, for $15,000.00. (R. 37). In stark contrast, the resource 
limit for a family the size of the Tibbetts }s $2,650.00. In 
light of the fact that Petitioner Tibbetts ccfuld legally sell 
this distinct parcel of six and one-half acr^s, the Executive 
Director was correct in ruling Tibbetts ineligible because of 
excess assets. 
Contrary to Petitioner's argument, his introduction of 
the city plat at the Fair Hearing is not dispositive of the issue 
of eligibility. (R. 46). Although on this exhibit the road on 
the plat is not readily identifiable and no Reference is made to 
an easement on a recent tax notice these factors do not refute 
the fact that Tibbetts owns a distinct six and one-half acre 
piece of property valued at $15,000.00, whicfy he has attempted to 
sell in the past. This property is even treated by Tibbetts as a 
parcel separate and apart from the remaining one and one-half 
acres on which his home sits. Thus, Tibbett$ has already 
admitted that there is an actual acreage division on his property 
as a result of the road, i.e., City of Genola's easement. 
Unquestionably, this property was correctly cpeemed to be a 
countable resource and excess asset by Executive Director Dandoy. 
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Petitioner further claims that Respondent Dandoy 
incorrectly applied APA regulations in determining that Tibbetts 
six and one-half acres constituted excess assets* Tibbetts is 
correct on page 12 of his brief when he claims "ownership of an 
eight acre lot does not automatically render him ineligible for 
Medicaid." Petitioner then contends that "only the equity of the 
excess property exceeding the average size is counted." 
(Petitioner's Brief, p. 12). Therefore, petitioner erroneously 
concludes that Respondent Dandoy should have only calculated that 
portion of property on the six and one-half acres which exceeds 
the average lot size for a residential lot in Genola, which is 
according to Petitioner Tibbetts, presumably, five acres. Thus, 
according to Tibbetts, Respondent Dandoy in determining assets 
should have only counted the 1.5 acres of property which exceeds 
the average lot size of five acres. 
This entire argument presupposes that the road does not 
divide the property into two distinct parcels. The lot which is 
exempt contains Tibbettfs home and one and one-half acres. No 
home is locat€*d on the property which has the remaining six and 
one-half acres. This property which contains no home is not 
exempt and, thus, is excluded from the formula of APA Vol. Ill 
§411.1, since it is non-exempt. The equity limitation, no matter 
how Petitioner calculates it, is irrelevant in this instance, 
since the six and one-half acres, which Tibbetts has attempted to 
sell for $15,000.00, and are separate from the lot containing 
Tibbetts home and are non-exempt assets that fall outside the 
home and lot exemption formula. Tibbetts cannot escape the fact 
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that he owns two separate parcels of property. The first is a 
lot with a home comprising one and one-half apres which is an 
exempt asset* The second parcel has six and One-half acres, has 
no home located on it and is separated by a rpad from the first 
parcel. It is nonexempt under the Medicaid regulations. 
A review of the record demonstrates that Executive 
Director Dandoy was not capricious in denying Tibbetts coverage 
and that Dandoy1s decision was supported by the evidence, as well 
as the relevant regulations. In this case, the claimant simply 
owns a countable, available resource which renders him 
ineligible. 
Judge Ballif affirmed Respondent Dandoy1s proper 
exercise of her administrative discretion after reviewing the 
record. The judge applied the correct standard under Utah Code 
Annotated §26-23-2(3). (R. 93). The judge then stated: 
Because the Executive Director's final 
determination was based on the evidence on record 
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the hearig [sic], her decision is not capripious 
and is supported by the evidence. (R. 94)• 
Respondent Dandoy concluded that a $15,000.00 asset 
cannot and should not be ignored in determining Medicaid 
eligibility. The Executive Director, as is her statutory duty in 
enforcing this joint federal-state program intended for the truly 
needy, has not acted capriciously, but has discharged her duty 
responsibly and properly. 
- 11 -
POINT II 
SINCE TIBBETTS1 FIRST APPLICATION WAS NEVER 
ACTUALLY APPROVED THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
Petitioner Tibbetts next avers that Respondent Dandoy 
should be estopped from denying him Medicaid benefits for his 
children's dental treatment in December 1985 based on Tibbetts1 
claim that some anonymous person in the OCO office had approved 
his request for assistance prior to January 1986. Tibbetts 
states that this verbal approval induced him to obtain dental 
treatment for his children and that therefore he relied on this 
statement of approval to his detriment. Moreover, Tibbetts, at 
his Fair Hearing, asserted that he had received a letter from the 
OCO office giving him approval for Medicaid during the month of 
December. (R. 33). However, notwithstanding Tibbetts1 version 
of the course of events in this case, the OCO office has no 
documentation whatsoever indicating that his January application 
for Medicaid was ever actually approved. Likewise, there is 
nothing in the record, besides Tibbetts1 assertion, that any 
representation was ever made by an OCO caseworker which would 
support his estoppel claim. 
Petitioner Tibbetts has not met the factual 
requirements justifying the interposition of the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. Therefore, there is no evidence to show that 
Petitioner justifiably relied upon verbal representations made by 
the OCO office in Provo. 
It is well settled that courts must be cautious in 
applying equitable estoppel against the state, especially when 
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the state is performing in its governmental, not proprietary, 
capacity. Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liauqr Control 
Commission. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Ut. 1979). Equitable estoppel, 
however, may be applied against the state in its governmental 
role when necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and if the 
exercise of governmental powers will not be impaired as a result 
of invoking the doctrine. Celebrity Club. Iqc. suprgi, at 6 94. 
In Celebrity Club, the petitioner sought administrative guidance 
from the Utah Liquor Control Commission concerning certain 
building requirements. The Commission issued a formal letter 
advising the petitioner that its building satisfied the 600 foot 
statutorily mandated required. Due to its reliance on this 
official correspondence, petitioner in Celebrity Club expended 
considerable funds to ensure that the club complied with the 
numerous requirements of the Commissions application. In 
estopping the Commission's subsequent denial of petitioner's 
liquor license application, the Court in Celebrity Club adopted 
the rationale of State v. Sponburah. 66 Washed 135, 401 P.2d 
635, 640 (1965). In Sponburah. the court he^d: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is properly 
applicable in a case such as this|, otherwise the 
whim of an administrative judge cduld bankrupt an 
applicant who acted in good faith jln reliance upon 
a solemn written commitment* !&• (Emphasis 
added) . 
Unlike the solemn written commitment upon which the 
applicant relied in Celebrity Club, there is absolutely nothing 
by way of documentation to support petitioner Tibbetts1 claim 
that someone in the OCO office had actually approved of his 
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assistance request, prior to Respondent's denial in March 1986• 
Although Tibbetts claims that he received formal confirmation 
from the office that he qualified for Medicaid, there was nothing 
introduced at his Fair Hearing or included as part of the record 
that would support this bald allegation of prior approval. 
Rather, the record shows that after Petitioner Tibbetts 
applied in January, his application was "never actually 
approved." (R. 32). In fact this application was "never 
approved or denied" by the original in-take worker at the OCO 
office in Provo. (R. 32). In fact, the OCO office did not 
collect the $87.35 in medical excess from Petitioner Tibbetts 
thinking that the application had been approved. (R. 32). The 
office representative, Clandia Johnson, when asked whether the 
medical excess had been collected as a sign of approval, stated: 
No. What they did is they collected it on an 
application. See, before they actually open it, 
what they do when they take an application for 
Medicaid is they will figure up and see if there 
is an excess. (R. 32) . 
Later Ms. Johnson explained: "They can't actually approve it 
[Medicaid Application] until the excess gets paid." (R. 33). 
There was absolutely nothing in Tibbett's case file 
that would indicate that Tibbetts had been approved sometime 
during the application process. Indeed, the opposite is true. 
The original caseworker made several notations in petitioner's 
file, but never actually approved or denied the application, 
which delay prompted Tibbetts to reapply in March. (R. 33-34). 
The first application was evidently held. (R. 34). Ms. Johnson 
conceded that it was irregular to accept the medical excess prior 
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to a determination of eligibility, however, Tibbetts received a 
refund of his Medicaid excess ($87*35) following OCO's denial. 
(R. 38)• Significantly, Tibbetts could not recall whatever 
happened to the so-called "letter" he supposedly received from 
OCO approving his application. (R. 3 8)• Ms. Johnson also stated 
that it would be unusual and not according to office policy for 
an OCO worker to approve any work until an application was 
completed and filed with the office. (R. 39)^ The OCO file had 
a copy of the denial letter and nothing indicating that a 
previous "approval" letter had been sent to Tibbetts. 
Furthermore, the instant case is unlike another casef 
Filipo v. Chang. Hawaii, 618 P.2d 295 (1980), upon which 
Petitioner relies. Filipo held that government could be estopped 
from asserting the invalidity of a regulation based on the 
applicant's noncompliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 
when such noncompliance had been created by the government's 
misfeasance and nonfeasance in its longstanding (23 years) 
interpretation and application of a regulation pertaining to AFDC 
assistance to pregnant women. Filipo involved the question 
whether an agency which had interpreted a certain regulation one 
way for 23 years can suddenly assert that such a policy was 
incorrect based on the fact that the agency discovered the 
regulation had not gone through proper rulemaking procedures. 
In the instant case, there was nothing done that was 
either unconscionable or contrary to a longstanding rule or 
policy. Mr. Tibbetts1 first application was never actually 
approved. It was held and neither approved nor denied. Nothing 
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in the file supports his claim of receiving prior confirmation of 
eligibility. After he applied a second time in March, the fact 
of his excess assets was discovered and he was sent a letter 
notifying him of his ineligibility. This decision was supported 
by the evidence and was sustained at three previous levels of 
review — Hearing Officer, Executive Director, District Court — 
as reasonable and justifiable under the pertinent regulations. 
The instant case, is also factually distinguishable 
from Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, Or.App., 613 
P.2d 495 (1980), another case cited by Petitioner Tibbetts. In 
Glover, supra, the applicant was found eligible for an ADC grant 
by the caseworker who opened a grant for the children. The court 
in Glover estopped the government from later denying the benefits 
when it found that no information or hopelessly confusing 
information had been given to the applicant as to how to meet the 
eligibility requirements. 
The instant case is not one in which the applicant was 
misinformed about eligibility requirements. Tibbetts1 first 
application was simply never formally acted upon by the first 
caseworker. Although Petitioner Tibbetts claims he received 
inconsistent information from the OCO office, there is nothing in 
the OCO file that supports this claim that he had received actual 
approval, even before his application was completed. 
Equitable estoppel should not be invoked against 
government conduct if the public interest would be unduly damaged 
by use of the doctrine. See Utah State University v. Sutro & 
Company. 646 P.2d 715, 719 (Ut. 1982). Here, Mr. Tibbetts never 
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received actual approval on his Medicaid request. Although he 
insists that he did, there is no independent corroborating 
evidence supporting his "prior approval" clai|m. No letter exists 
and the caseworker who allegedly told Tibbetts to proceed with 
the dental work without actual approval remains anonymous. 
If equitable estoppel is interpose^ in the instant 
case, such a precedent would have a paralyzing effect on the 
operation of government. Such a ruling wouldl enable other 
applicants for financial aid in the future to raise similarly 
unsubstantiated, amorphous claims of approval against the 
government, when the record is totally devoid of evidence, but 
for the applicant's self-serving version of tihe facts. 
Accordingly, equitable estoppel should not be invoked 
when an applicant's recollection differs from a government file. 
It certainly should not be used in the instant case when no 
actual approval was ever given the applicant on his first 
application. This doctrine should only be usled in extraordinary 
situations involving serious manifest injustice. Clearly, the 
facts in the instant case do no warrant such a label. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's Final 
Determination denying Tibbetts' Medicaid application should be 
affirmed. -
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A^/ day of July, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
J/C S^SFH^N MIKITA 
A^ssi£l:ant attorney General 
Human Resources Division 
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